There is an ongoing question amongst military blogs, foreign policy journals, and the administration itself on what should we be doing in Afghanistan? But, that isn't the full question. To assume there is a question such as what should we be doing, it is assuming that we have first answered the question of how do you "fix" Afghanistan.
Now I put "fix" in those quotations because that is a very loose word to use. But, probably the easiest to get our minds around. There are probably some fancy big PHD words that could be inserted, but what it all boils down to is; how do we fix the problem(s)?
I could list out a laundry list of issues to dive into. But, this is not my thesis I'm writing. Actually this is part of my thesis but trust me, that is long enough, I don't need to replicate that length here. That and its not that good...yet. But, I digress. I am going to concentrate on one issue here, local governance.
I choose local governance for a number of reasons. One, the tribal system has been weakened significantly in many areas of the country from the last three decades of warfare. This has bred two situations for the Taliban to take advantage of. First, the Taliban has been able to outright overcome weakened tribal systems and take their place. Two, in areas of multiple weakened tribes, they are able to play them off of one another, or cause coalitions to form and pit them in that way against one another. In both of these examples that has provided an opportunity for the Taliban to exert influence over the people.
Second, the Government of Afghanistan is a central unitary government. Most of the concentration has been on developing the governance at this level. The Provinces, Districts, and then local village level were given priority for support and assistance in that order for many years. This has created a situation where leadership at the local level is either non-existent in an official status or in hiding because of lack of security. This again, has developed a situation, where the Taliban has been able to apply pressure and provide local leadership to the people. In a vacuum the people have gone with whoever is there.
Third, most of the financial support, aid, and revenue is concentrated at the central governance level in Afghanistan. This has led to a situation where financial aid and support is not reaching the local level with any degree of efficiency. In addition, the revenue sharing between the central government and the Provinces, and Districts is almost non-existent. This leads to a situation where one, there is not a consistent stream of money to plan for development from; and two, the people begin to feel that they have no say in the usage of the money. Finally, the people begin to have an attitude that the government can not provide for them. In that vacuum, again, the Taliban have arrived and exploited them with providing money, and jobs in the form of Poppy Farming.
With this being said, I would list my major "thing" to "fix" in Afghanistan as providing, mentoring, securing, and training local governance. By strengthening the local governance and tribal systems you take away that opportunity for the Taliban to use against us. Second you begin to provide an apparatus to provide penetration for the government and revenue sharing down to local level. This both takes away this opportunity from the Taliban to exploit, and provides for long term stability.
In addition I would advise a more Federal System of Government for Afghanistan, with autonomous areas. But, truth be told, that is my thesis and it needs much more development. But, when I have finished it, and it is approved and I have successfully defended it, I will publish it here.
God Bless America
Bryan
Sphere: Related Content
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)

9 comments:
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 06/11/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.
This blogging thing is somewhat addictive. I will attempt to refrain from posting a comment under everything but I ask the readers to indulge me a little as I am new to this process. (Does that make me sound old and slightly similar to a neo-Luddite?)
Anyway, I really enjoyed this post and I agree with everything Bryan stated. I would suggest in addition, and this goes toward my own research so I am honor bound to throw out the "my research" flag here, that one of key things almost everyone is missing is the question of cultural identity.
Is anyone engaged in asking the local people in the various provinces or AOs what type of governance they desire? Do they want to return to tribal rule? Do they want a strong centralized bureaucracy? Do they even want or understand the democratic process? What do local Afghanis hold dear in terms of local governance? This is where I would begin.
Sir,
Could not agree more. Historically speaking, the Afghans have leaned towards decentralized control based around their tribal structure. Ill throw in the "my research" flag here also:) But, from what I am researching right now, strong centralized government does not a very good history of positive outcomes. That is what has led me down the road in my monograph to considering whether a federal system with autonomous areas would be better for them.
That way the areas could choose what they wanted. They could choose agricultural or industrial based economies. They could choose a lifestyle and governance that mirrored their own tribal identity. It could provide a framework for peaceful conflict resolution between different ethnic groups.
I'm still working out the details and typing away this monograph week on it, but that is where I am leaning right now.
Bryan
Then allow me to simply say "Hooah!"
PS if your working on your monograph, then how do these blog posts, by you, keep showing up.
Sir,
They are my sanity breaks...lol. :)
Bryan
It is so weird to hear you say that. I am grading ANP papers and these blog posting along with an article idea that popped into my mind on the way to work are my sanity breaks. So in some ways my "monograph" (article research) is my sanity break from grading. Let me know if I am cluttering up the board too much.
Sir,
Nope, not at all. There was a very good discussion that went on about this last night on the Twitter side of the blog. David M also linked in to the article for the Thunder Run so I have to hop over there and see if there has been any comments.
Bryan
From your information it appears that the Taliban are just more organized than any other group. But, this is natural because the Taliban know the lay of the land, the language, and local customs including the opium trade.
If the Coalition and Afghan government cannot become more organized than the Taliban then the other option is to disorganize the Taliban. Methods similar to Major General Edward G. Lansdale could be undertaken.
There are probably hundreds of ways to sabotage, sow dissension, misinformation, and mistrust among the Taliban.
One could buy a large poppy farm and pose as a real seller. This could be method of infiltrating the Taliban, finding poppy and arms trading points, sabotaging their operations, and liquidating top leaders.
A good infiltrator could sell bogus opium, inject counterfeit but traceable currency into the Taliban’s trading system thereby draining financial resources of the Taliban.
Rival Taliban factions could be played against each other. Debouching of poppy fields could be done. Introducing defective weapons could be implemented. Various Psy Ops could be carried out. Taliban leaders could be turned.
The key is destroying the Taliban from with in. It will take clever planning and unique methods but American fighting men have the ingenuity to over come the Taliban.
Ledger,
Agree with many of your points. Opium is important since it is one of the funding chains for the Taliban. There is actually a couple books out there right now that have put forth the thesis that if you can cut this funding, then the Taliban will out-right lose. I'm somewhere in the middle on that one.
My personal belief right now though, is if people have sound local governance with money coming from other sources then the Taliban loses their position they are using to exploit this from.
If the village is secure, has a sound leadership chain, police and judicial systems, and a revenue stream then we have ourselves a strong "village" unit. You build eneough of these, and you have strong districts...etc etc.
I can't argue with anything you said, they are all very good ideas. I just wonder if that fixes the long term problems or just cuts the Taliban out of the equation?
Bryan
Post a Comment