A friend of mine just sent this to me, and at first I thought it was a joke. BUT, it wasn't, this is completely on the level, and published over at Military.com on the Op-Ed Page.
From Military.Com: by William Lind:Mr. William Lind is the Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. He writes a lot, and I'm sure he's a very intelligent man. I've read some of his pieces in the past and had my differences in thought on them, but different view points make us stronger, so I never really got too fired up over them. This one was much different though.
He first states,
"because American infantry tactics are bad. They amount to little more than bumping into the enemy and calling for fire. The easiest way to provide the overwhelming firepower our bad infantry tactics depend on is with airstrikes. So to win tactically, we have to lose strategically."I'm pretty sure he has missed something in the last twenty years, but I can't even begin to understand how he missed everything. I've been serving now for almost twelve years. Within that twelve year period I have seen us embrace change time and time again. Whether it was better understanding of combined arms operations, to design, to situational understanding and maneuver out of contact; change has been constant. Just in the last six years, I have seen us grow exponentially on de-centralized operations and speed and tempo that make operations I did as a Lieutenant look like something out of the 19th Century.
He further goes on to say,
"The first is the unfortunate combination of hubris and intellectual sloth which characterizes most of the American officer corps – and infantry officers in particular. Most read nothing about their profession. Of those who do read, most confine their study to doctrinal manuals.." Again, I don't even know where to start. As an Infantry Officer, from the time I was in the Officer Basic Course, we read extensively, and trust me it wasn't doctrinal manuals. I would challenge him to find an Infantry Officer that only reads doctrinal manuals, or for that matter one who has read them extensively. I'm not saying we don't read our doctrinal manuals, but I know for myself, I skim it, I store the good ideas, and then do what I think is best in each situation. Since OBC, I've attended the Command Course, CAS3, the Combined and General Staff College, and now the School for Advanced Military Studies. Each and every one of these schools was grounded in the idea of professional development through education and understanding of literature on our profession. History, governance, leadership, political theory, international relations, theory.....all of them have been extensively taught. So again, I'm a bit confused by his statements.
He keeps on going though with this comment,
"The second reason we persist with bad infantry tactics is bad training. Almost all American training is focused on procedures and techniques, taught by rote in canned, scripted exercises where the enemy is a tethered goat.But free-play training is so rare in the American military that most American infantrymen receive none at all."I absolutely love a statement I can debate empirically. As a Company Commander, over 75% of my training operations were conducted against a "free-play" enemy force. Yes, there was some training at the beginning that we scripted. But after those initial events it quickly became entirely free-play. As a matter of fact, the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the Joint Maneuver Training Center all employ free-play training. These were concepts that were generated in the early 1980's. Again, I'm lost how he missed these developments.
Finally he finishes on,
"The third reason American tactics are bad is a bad personnel system. American infantry units are allowed to maintain personnel stability only for short periods, and sometimes not at all. They are always receiving new, largely untrained troops, who have to be taught "the basics," which is assumed to mean procedures and techniques."Well I would like to ask, what we should change towards? Should we enlist a man for 20 years and keep him in one place? The facts are that soldiers enlist. We are a volunteer Army. An example would be a soldier that enlists for a four year period. He would arrive to a post, have about three and a half years left on his contract, and then be eligible to stay with the unit, move, or leave the service. Yes, it would be nice to just have him stay in one place if he chooses to re-enlist, but that is also a detriment. A soldier that spends his entire career on one post, only has the experience from that post and that type of infantry. He would only know how to function in a Bradley, or in an Airborne assignment. My personal belief is I would much rather have a soldier, NCO, and or Officer who has served in a variety of Infantry assignments so he has critical experiences from all the Infantry.
In addition, no matter what you do, you will always have new soldiers. That's just they way of the world, its called people age and get older. No matter how much we may want to avoid it, the hands of the clock keep on ticking no matter what. That is where training enters the picture. Training and taking care of soldiers is our number one priority within the Army and no-where will you see this more hammered home then in the Infantry Branch.
William Lind apparently has missed the last twenty eight years. It's too bad, because it sounds like many of the ideas he has put forward may have held sway in 1980, but definitely not now. As a matter of fact, if this critique was published in 1980 it might have been more salient. Unfortunately that lapse in time that he obviously has missed, takes away any credibility of his article.
God Bless America
Bryan
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